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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether an 
individual convicted of an unlawful sale of firearms is 
entitled to an offense level reduction pursuant to the 
"sporting purposes" provision of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(b)(2). 
 
Jonathan Miller ("Miller") pled guilty in the District Court 
to one count of selling firearms without a license, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(a)(1)(A). At sentencing, Miller 
argued that because he had possessed the firearms at issue 
for "sporting purposes"-- until he chose to sell them 
unlawfully -- he was entitled to an offense level reduction 
to offense level six. If Miller received such a reduction, he 
would be subject to between zero and six months of 
incarceration under the Guidelines. The District Court 
rejected Miller's argument, and we will affirm, albeit for 
reasons different than those provided by the District Court.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We may affirm a District Court's judgment on grounds other than 
those considered by the District Court itself. See, e.g., PAAC v. Rizzo, 
502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974) ("It is proper for an appellate court 
to affirm a correct decision of a lower court even when that decision is 
based on an inappropriate ground."). 
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I 
 
On January 9, 1998, a federal grand jury returned afive- 
count indictment against Miller, generally charging him 
with violations of federal firearms law. In particular, the 
indictment charged that on February 6, 1997, Miller had 
sold both an Israel Military Industries Desert Eagle model 
.44 magnum semi-automatic handgun and a Ruger GP100 
model .357 magnum revolver, along with ammunition 
consisting of four magazines of hollow point bullets to an 
undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency in New 
Jersey. On February 21, 1997, Miller sold, to the same 
undercover agent -- this time in Pennsylvania-- a German 
Luger-style handgun possessing nine millimeter and .30 
caliber barrels. Finally, on September 26, 1997, Miller sold 
a fourth firearm -- a Thompson target/hunting pistol with 
.45, .410, and .223 caliber barrels -- to the same agent in 
New Jersey. The indictment specifically charged Miller with 
the sale of firearms without a license, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 922(a)(1)(A), transportation of afirearm in 
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g), and 
possession of ammunition, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g).2 
 
Federal authorities arrested Miller on April 1, 1999. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement executed by both Miller and 
the government on July 22, 1999, in exchange for the 
dismissal of the remaining four counts of the indictment, 
on August 19, 1999, Miller pled guilty to count one of the 
indictment, which charged him with selling firearms 
without a license. 
 
The District Court sentenced Miller on December 13, 
1999. Because Miller had been convicted of an offense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Both the transportation and possession charges stem from the fact 
that Miller had "been convicted in a[ ] court of[ ] a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). 
Miller's presentence report indicates that he had been arrested in 1983 
on state theft charges in Pennsylvania. PSR P 29. In 1983, "theft by 
unlawful taking" was a felony of the third degree under Pennsylvania law 
if the article stolen was valued at over $2000. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 3903(a) (1983). A felony of the third degree is punishable by a 
maximum of seven years imprisonment. See id.S 106(b)(4). 
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concerning a "prohibited transaction involvingfirearms," 
the court was required to sentence Miller in accordance 
with section 2K2.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. Miller's previous felony conviction required that 
he be classified as a "prohibited person" under section 2K2.1,3 
and the District Court thereupon set his base offense level 
at fourteen. See U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(a)(6).4 The fact that Miller 
had sold four different weapons subjected him to a one- 
level increase to fifteen, see id. S 2K2.1(b)(1), or nine levels 
above that provided by section 2K2.1(b)(2). 
 
Miller argued that he was entitled to a reduction to level 
six pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)(2) of the Guidelines 
because each of the weapons involved in his offense were 
possessed "solely for sporting purposes or collection." The 
District Court rejected Miller's argument, holding that 
because Miller had sold the firearms at issue in violation of 
federal law, he had engaged in an "unlawful use" of the 
firearms, and was therefore barred from receiving the 
"sporting purposes" reduction. At Miller's sentencing 
hearing, the District Court stated, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
 
       I believe that there is an unclear issue here of law. . . 
       and I am sufficiently persuaded that this is a question 
       of first impression, if you will, in this Circuit at least, 
       that I will simply make a ruling based upon my legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Application note six to section 2K2.1 defines "prohibited person" as, 
inter alia, "anyone who . . . is under indictment for, or has been 
convicted of, a `crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year,' as defined by 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(20)." U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1 application 
note 6. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(20) provides that "[w]hat 
constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings 
were held." As stated earlier, see supra n.2, Pennsylvania law requires 
that a "felony of the third degree" be punishable by a maximum of seven 
years of incarceration. Miller, who, as we have noted, had been 
previously convicted in Pennsylvania for "theft by unlawful taking," is 
therefore deemed a "prohibited person." 
 
4. Section 2K2.1(a)(6) provides a base offense level of fourteen "if the 
defendant (A) is a prohibited person; or (B) is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
S 921(a)(30)." U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(a)(6). 
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       interpretation and allow the parties to take their 
       contentions on appeal. 
 
       I hold that the unambiguous language of Section 
       2K2.1(b)(2) indicates that the scope of this Court's 
       inquiry should be limited to cases in which possession 
       has occurred and the defendant did not "unlawfully 
       discharge or otherwise unlawfully use" the firearm. 
       Here, where the defendant's offense was that he sold 
       the firearms in an unlawful transaction, I hold that 
       that conduct is covered under the term "unlawfully 
       use" as found in this subsection, and therefore, that he 
       is not eligible for the six level offense which is afforded 
       for those who strictly use all ammunition and firearms 
       solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection. 
 
Sentencing Transcript, at 20-22. The District Court thus 
essentially held that a reduction pursuant to section 
2K2.1(b)(2) to level six was unavailable, as a matter of law, 
to defendants convicted of firearm trafficking offenses.5 
 
After allowing a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, Miller's sentencing range pursuant to the 
Guidelines was between twelve and eighteen months of 
imprisonment, and the District Court sentenced him to a 
prison term of twelve months and one day. Anticipating 
that Miller planned to appeal its determination concerning 
his application for a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction, and that 
our disposition on appeal would likely be rendered 
subsequent to Miller's release, the District Court stayed 
Miller's sentence on December 22, 1999. 
 
II 
 
The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the District Court, as a result of its holding, did not 
render any factual finding concerning the reason for which Miller 
initially 
possessed the firearms; that is, before he engaged in the illegal sale for 
which he was convicted. Sentencing Transcript, at 23 ("If such an 
inquiry needs to be made, this Court is equipped to do it, but I don't 
think it is, and so my ruling is that this section does not apply in the 
circumstances of this case . . . as applied to the charge in this case." 
(emphasis added)). 
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over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. Because 
Miller appeals from the District Court's final judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and raises an issue concerning 
the District Court's calculation of his sentence, our 
appellate jurisdiction is grounded in both the final order 
doctrine of 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). As 
Miller argues that the District Court erred in its 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines, our review is 
plenary. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 209 F.3d 308, 
311 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
III 
 
As its title, "Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or 
Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition: Prohibited 
Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition," suggests, 
the Sentencing Commission intended section 2K2.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines generally to govern the sentencing of 
defendants convicted of any number of firearms offenses. In 
addition to listing the base offense levels for the various 
firearms offenses, section 2K2.1 also provides"specific 
offense characteristics"; that is, circumstances particular to 
a given defendant's actual conduct that, if established, 
would either increase or decrease a particular defendant's 
offense level. One such provision is the focus of the instant 
appeal, section 2K2.1(b)(2), which is colloquially known as 
the "sporting purposes reduction." See Thomas W. 
Hutchinson, et al., Federal Sentencing Law and Practice 
621 (2000). In full, section 2K2.1(b)(2) reads as follows: 
 
       If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to 
       subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed 
       all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting 
       purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge 
       or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or 
       ammunition, decrease the offense level determined 
       above to level 6. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
The terms of section 2K2.1(b)(2) call for the establishment 
of three requirements in order to warrant an offense level 
reduction: (1) that the defendant is not subject to 
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subsections 2K2.1(a)(1)-(5);6 (2) that the defendant 
"possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful 
sporting purposes or collection"; and (3) that the defendant 
"did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use 
such firearms or ammunition." The defendant must 
establish each of these elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Dudley, 62 F.3d 1275, 
1276 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gonzales , 12 F.3d 
298, 301 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 
As stated earlier, the District Court recognized that Miller 
had satisfied the first requirement, in that he was not 
subject to subsections 2K2.1(a)(1)-(a)(5). The District Court 
then assumed that Miller could satisfy his burden with 
respect to the second requirement, yet held that because 
Miller had illegally sold the firearms at issue, he had 
"unlawfully used" the firearms, and therefore could not 
meet his burden with respect to the third requirement. Our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In full, sections 2K2.1(a)(1)-(a)(5) provide as follows: 
 
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest): 
 
       (1) 26, if the offense involved a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 
       S 5845(a) [definitions of particularfirearms] or 18 U.S.C. S 
921(a)(30) 
       [definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon"], and the defendant 
       had at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence 
       or a controlled substance offense; or 
 
       (2) 24, if the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions 
of 
       either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; or 
 
       (3) 22, if the offense involved a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 
       S 5845(a) or 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(30), and the defendant had one 
prior 
       felony conviction of either a crime of violence or controlled 
       substance offense; or 
 
       (4) 20, if -- 
 
       (A) the defendant had one prior felony conviction of either a crime 
       of violence or a controlled substance offense; or 
 
       (B) the offense involved a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. S 5845(a) 
       or 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(30); and the defendant (i) is a prohibited 
       person; or (ii) is convicted under 18 U.S.C. S 922(d); or 
 
       (5) 18, if the offense involved a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 
       S 5845(a) or 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(3) . . .. 
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analysis, however, differs from that of the District Court 
inasmuch as we hold that Miller did not satisfy the second 
requirement of the guideline; because Miller sold the 
firearms, he did not possess them "solely for a lawful 
sporting purposes or collection." 
 
A 
 
The government concedes that Miller was not subject to 
subsections (a)(1)-(a)(5) of section 2K2.1(b)(2). Instead, 
Miller is a "prohibited person" by virtue of his 1983 
Pennsylvania conviction. Accordingly, Miller was properly 
assigned a base offense level of fourteen pursuant to 
section 2K2.1(a)(6), which the District Court increased to 
fifteen as a result of Miller's multi-firearm transaction. 
 
B 
 
As stated above, the second requirement of a claim for a 
section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction mandates that the defendant 
establish that he "possessed all ammunition andfirearms 
[at issue] for lawful sporting purposes or collection." We 
held in United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 1993), 
that "the plain and unambiguous language of the 
Sentencing Guidelines affords the best recourse for their 
proper interpretation." Id. at 670; see also 2A Norman J. 
Singer, Statutes and Statutory ConstructionS 46.01, at 53 
(West Supp. 1999). In our view, the plain language of 
section 2K2.1(b)(2) excludes trafficking offenses from the 
offense level reduction provided by the provision. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that section 2K2.1(b)(2) 
stipulates that the firearms in question must have been 
"possessed . . . solely for lawful sporting purposes or 
collection." U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(b)(2) (emphasis added). More 
importantly, the relevant Guidelines provision does not use 
the terms "traffic," "sell," or "transfer" to describe conduct 
connected with a sporting or collective purpose that would 
entitle a particular defendant to an offense level reduction. 
 
The Commission did use such language, however, in 
other subsections to section 2K2.1, thereby emphasizing 
the omission of these terms in the "sporting purposes" 
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guideline. For example, section 2K2.1(b)(5) generally 
provides a four level increase to a defendant's base offense 
level 
 
       [i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or 
       ammunition in connection with another felony offense; 
       or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition 
       with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it 
       would be used or possessed in connection with another 
       felony offense. 
 
Id. S 2K2.1(b)(5) (emphasis added). The fact that the 
Sentencing Commission included language within certain 
provisions of section 2K2.1 that would clearly include 
trafficking, sale, or transfer offenses, but chose not to 
include such language within the terms of section 
2K2.1(b)(2), is sufficient to conclude that the Commission 
did not intend for section 2K2.1(b)(2) to apply to those 
defendants convicted of trafficking, sale, or transfer 
offenses. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983) (" `[W]here Congress includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.' " (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 
F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam))); see also United 
States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(applying the principle established in Russello  to a 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. 
Olivares, 905 F.2d 623, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
(same). 
 
As stated earlier, the District Court convicted Miller of 
selling firearms without a license. Because the specific 
characteristics of Miller's offense therefore establish that 
Miller did not merely possess the firearms in question, but 
rather sold them, the plain meaning of the Sentencing 
Guidelines bars Miller from obtaining an offense level 
reduction pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)(2). Miller's brief, 
however, raises a number of arguments, to which we now 
turn.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although Miller does not specify the arguments discussed in Section 
IV of this opinion in his "Statement of the Issues," we have gleaned from 
the discussion in his brief that he relies upon the arguments we catalog 
in Section IV. 
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IV 
 
A 
 
Miller first argues that the Commission intended the 
word "possessed" in section 2K2.1(b)(2) to refer to a 
defendant's use of the firearms in question only up until the 
date of the conduct giving rise to his conviction-- in this 
case, the sale of the firearms. In other words, Miller asserts 
that he is entitled to a reduction pursuant to section 
2K2.1(b)(2) if he had possessed the firearms in question for 
lawful sporting purposes up until the date he illegally sold 
the same. Initially, we note that the plain language of 
section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not in any way limit its provisions 
in a temporal fashion. Even if we were to harbor doubt 
concerning Miller's argument, however, application note 10 
to section 2K2.1, referring to section 2K2.1(b)(2), provided 
by the Sentencing Commission itself, states that 
 
       [u]nder subsection(b)(2), "lawful sporting purposes or 
       collection" as determined by the surrounding 
       circumstances, provides for a reduction to an offense 
       level of 6. Relevant surrounding circumstances include 
       the number and type of firearms, the amount and type 
       of ammunition, the location and circumstances of 
       possession and actual use, the nature of the 
       defendant's criminal history . . . and the extent to 
       which possession was restricted by local law. 
 
Id. S 2K2.1 application note 10 (emphasis added).8 In our 
view, by authorizing the courts to inquire into the"actual 
use" to which the defendant put the firearms in question, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Analogizing the commentary in the Guidelines (e.g., the application 
notes) to "legislative rules," the Supreme Court has held that "provided 
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the 
Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given`controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' " 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); see also U.S.S.G. S 1B1.7 
("Failure to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect 
application of the guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible 
reversal 
on appeal."). As such, we are bound by any interpretive guidance 
provided by the Sentencing Commission through the application notes. 
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the Sentencing Commission has evinced its intent to extend 
the relevant inquiry (i.e., whether the defendant possessed 
all firearms for lawful sporting purposes) to the conduct 
giving rise to the instant conviction -- here, the unlawful 
sale. Each of our sister circuits to have considered the 
issue have so held. See, e.g., United States v. Gresso, 24 
F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The other circuits are in 
accord: not only must a firearm be of a type that would be 
acquired for sporting uses or for collection, but it must also 
be possessed or used solely for those purposes."); United 
States v. Shell, 972 F.2d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[I]s is 
not sufficient that one among several intended uses might 
be lawful recreation or collection; one of those must be the 
sole intended use."); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 
363, 364 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("In our view, the 
commentary makes clear that application of the reduction 
depends on both intended and actual use.").9 
 
B 
 
Miller next argues that an interpretation preventing all 
defendants convicted of the unlawful sale of firearms from 
receiving an offense level reduction pursuant to section 
2K2.1(b)(2) would nullify the application of this provision to 
those defendants, like Miller, whose initial offense level was 
provided by section 2K2.1(a)(6). The District Court set 
Miller's initial offense level, pursuant to section 2K2.1(a)(6), 
at fourteen because he was a "prohibited person"; that is, 
an individual who, inter alia, "has been convicted of[ ] a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has confronted and rejected virtually the 
same argument that Miller makes in the present matter. In United States 
v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1989), the defendant (a previously- 
convicted felon) had purchased a rifle for hunting purposes, but was 
convicted of unlawful possession after he fired the gun in his home 
during an argument with his wife. See id. at 364. Like Miller, the 
defendant argued that he was entitled to a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction 
because he had possessed the rifle for sporting purposes up until the 
moment of the conduct that led to his conviction. The Eighth Circuit, 
however, rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the conduct 
that led to the underlying conviction was relevant to the district court's 
determination as to whether the defendant possessed the firearm in 
question solely for sporting purposes. See id. at 364-65. 
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`crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,' 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. S 921(a)(20)." U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1 
application note 6; see also supra nn. 3-4. As we stated 
earlier, Miller is not automatically disqualified from 
receiving a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction as a result of being 
sentenced pursuant to section 2K2.1(a)(6). Rather, as an 
individual whose base offense level was determined under 
section 2K2.1(a)(6), he is eligible for a section 2K2.1(b)(2) 
reduction if he meets that section's requirements. 
 
Our holding that section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not extend to 
those defendants convicted of trafficking offenses, however, 
does not render the provision a nullity; to the contrary, 
defendants who are considered "prohibited persons" under 
section 2K2.1(a)(6) could have been defendants who have 
been convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm.10 As 
such, certain defendants who are classified as"prohibited 
persons" are eligible for a reduction pursuant to section 
2K2.1(b)(2). It is therefore not inconsistent to allow those 
defendants whose initial offense levels were obtained 
through section 2K2.1(a)(6) to be eligible for a section 
2K2.1(b)(2) reduction, but then to limit such a reduction to 
only those defendants convicted of illegally possessing a 
firearm, when such a firearm has solely been used for 
sporting purposes or collection. 
 
C 
 
Miller also argues that the history surrounding the 
present-day version of section 2K2.1 evinces an intent to 
allow defendants convicted of trafficking offenses to benefit 
from the reduction provided by section 2K2.1(b)(2). Prior to 
November 1, 1991, what is presently section 2K2.1 was 
actually three separate guidelines; to wit, sections 2K2.1, 
2K2.2 (now deleted), and 2K2.3 (now deleted). Each of the 
three sections separately and respectively dealt with the 
sentencing of defendants convicted of possession offenses, 
trafficking offenses, and transportation offenses with intent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Federal statute renders it a crime for an individual "who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). 
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or knowledge that the firearms would be used in future 
crimes. 
 
The "sporting purposes reduction" (former section 
2K2.1(b)(1)) was exclusively located within the guideline 
concerning possession offenses, and there was no 
comparable provision within either sections 2K2.2 
(trafficking) or 2K2.3 (transportation). In 1991, however, the 
Sentencing Commission consolidated all three sections into 
one, the present-day section 2K2.1. Miller argues that this 
consolidation manifests an intent on the part of the 
Sentencing Commission to allow any defendant convicted of 
a firearms offense to obtain an offense level reduction 
pursuant to section 2K2.1(b)(2), even when the defendant 
fails to meet the requirements of the possessory"sporting 
purposes" reduction of section 2K2.1(b)(2). 
 
The mere consolidation of all firearms offenses into a 
single guideline, without more, however, is insufficient to 
contradict the plain meaning of section 2K2.1(b)(2). Indeed, 
the Sentencing Commission, if it desired, could have 
provided that upon consolidation, the "sporting purposes" 
reduction applied to all firearms offenses, including sale, 
transfer, or trafficking. It did not do so. 
 
D 
 
Miller's final argument centers around application note 8 
to section 2K2.1. In full, application note 8 states as 
follows: 
 
       Subsection (a)(7) includes the interstate transportation 
       or interstate distribution of firearms, which is 
       frequently committed in violation of state, local, or 
       other federal law restricting the possession offirearms, 
       or for some other underlying unlawful purpose. In the 
       unusual case in which it is established that neither 
       avoidance of state, local, or other federal firearms law, 
       nor any other underlying unlawful purpose was 
       involved, a reduction in the base offense level to no 
       lower than level 6 may be warranted to reflect the less 
       serious nature of the violation. 
 
Id. S 2K2.1 application note 8. Miller essentially argues that 
because section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not specifically disqualify 
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defendants whose initial offense level is obtained pursuant 
to section 2K2.1(a)(7), and application note 8 specifically 
indicates that a district court may reduce the offense level 
of a defendant convicted of a trafficking offense to level six, 
the Sentencing Commission intended for all such 
defendants to receive the benefit of a section 2K2.1(b)(2) 
reduction. 
 
We disagree. As an initial matter, application note 8 
tellingly lacks any reference whatsoever to section 
2K2.1(b)(2). Moreover, application note 8 does not specify 
that a defendant must prove that the firearms possessed 
were solely for "lawful sporting purposes or collection," as 
required by section 2K2.1(b)(2). Hence, application note 8 
has no relationship to the "sporting purposes" reduction of 
section 2K2.1(b)(2). Inasmuch as the sole issue before us is 
whether Miller is entitled to a reduction to offense level six 
pursuant to the "sporting purposes" provision of section 
2K2.1(b)(2), and not whether Miller is entitled to a 
reduction to offense level six provided for other purposes in 
some other section of the Sentencing Guidelines, we reject 
Miller's argument. Indeed, our review of the record 
indicates that Miller failed even to mention application note 
8 to the District Court, let alone seek an offense level 
reduction pursuant to its terms. Because we believe that 
the reduction to which application note 8 refers does not 
concern the specific characteristics of Miller's offense and 
has no connection with the with the specific reduction 
provided by section 2K2.1(b)(2) for firearms possessed solely 
for lawful sporting purposes or collection, Miller's argument 
fails. 
 
E 
 
Because Miller cannot establish that he possessed the 
firearms at issue in the instant matter "solely for lawful 
sporting purposes," we need not entertain nor address the 
argument concerning whether Miller's unauthorized sale of 
the firearms constituted an "unlawful use"-- the third 
requirement of a claim for a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction. 
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V 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's order of December 15, 1999, sentencing Miller to a 
term of incarceration spanning twelve months and one day.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The District Court, in its December 22, 1999 order, among other 
things, provided for Miller's surrender to the custody of the United 
States 
Marshal for the District of New Jersey in the event that the judgment 
Miller appealed was affirmed. In light of our affirmance, we assume that 
the stay of sentence imposed by the District Court will be discharged 
and the sentence carried out.United States v. Miller, No. 00-5052. 
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Stanton, J., dissenting: 
 
Standing alone, S 2K2.1(b)(2) could be read (as the 
majority does) not to apply to unlawful sales, but only to 
unlawful possession. 
 
But subsection (b)(2) does not stand alone. It must be 
read in connection with Application Note 8. 
 
Reading both together is not only natural; as the 
Government urges, it is a necessity. Quite correctly, the 
Government points out that "the base offense level 
reduction to level 6 referred to in Application Note 8 can 
only be understood to mean the reduction to level 6 
provided by S 2K2.1(b)(2)." Appellee's br. 12, n. 9. As the 
Government explains, "Otherwise, Application Note 8 would 
be meaningless because there is no other operative base 
level reduction provision within the rubric of S 2K2.1." Id. 
 
Integrally, Application Note 8 ties subsection (b)(2)'s 
reduction to sales, even though it may be unusual that a 
particular sale will qualify: 
 
       Subsection (a)(7) includes the interstate transportation 
       or interstate distribution of firearms, which is 
       frequently committed in violation of state, local, or 
       other federal law restricting the possession offirearms, 
       or from some other underlying unlawful purpose. In 
       the unusual case in which it is established that neither 
       avoidance of state, local, or other federal firearms law, 
       nor any other underlying unlawful purpose was 
       involved, a reduction in the base offense level to no 
       lower than level 6 may be warranted to reflect the less 
       serious nature of the violation. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1, Commentary, Application Note 8. 
 
Thus, subsection (b)(2)'s sentence reduction, and 
Application Note 8's application of it to sales, are 
harmonious rather than in conflict. 
 
The question whether the sale is a "use" which bars the 
reduction in subsection (b)(2) will be decided by whether 
the sale satisfied Note 8's requirements, and the seller's 
pre-sale possession complied with (b)(2). 
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The case should be remanded for determination whether 
Mr. Miller's pre-sale possession was of the peaceable 
character required by subsection (b)(2), and whether his 
sales met the requirements of Application Note 8. If both 
qualify, his base level should be reduced to level 6. 
 
The majority affirms a sentence imposed by a Judge who 
believed the law prevented her from even considering such 
matters. Respectfully, I dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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